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Abstract
In the homogenous good case, the relationship between market struc-
ture and e±ciency was studied extensively. Assuming a standard quadratic
utility with quantity competition, this paper carries on the analysis in a
di®erentiated good context. It can be shown that there is a positive re-
lationship between market heterogeneity and e±ciency, too. In contrast
to the homogenous good case, consumer surplus as well as producer
surplus increases with the dispersion of marginal costs.
JEL classi¯cation: L13, L11, L4
Keywords: Di®erentiated goods; Cournot; Asymmetric costs; Cost variation;
Welfare1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the relationship between e±ciency and market hetero-
geneity in a di®erentiated good oligopoly. Market heterogeneity is caused by
di®erently e±cient ¯rms. The pivotal question is whether society is better
o® in case of a more heterogeneous market structure or not. Assuming stan-
dard quadratic utility according to Dixit, social surplus is the measure for
Pareto-optimality since preferences are quasi-linear. The impact of a conjec-
tural marginal cost variation on consumer surplus as well as producer surplus
and therefore social surplus is analyzed. An arbitrarily marginal cost variation
is decomposed into an average component and a heterogeneity component.
The former increases or decreases all marginal costs to the same degree. The
latter increases or decreases the dispersion of marginal costs and lets average
marginal costs unchanged.
In the homogenous good case there is a positive relationship between mar-
ket heterogeneity and e±ciency. Consumer surplus solely depends on aggre-
gated output which in turn only depends on average marginal costs. Total
cost of production, however, decreases with the dispersion of marginal costs.
Since total revenue (equal to aggregated expenditure) is constant, producer
surplus increases with the dispersion of marginal costs. Hence, there is a posi-
tive relationship between market heterogeneity (given by the distribution of
marginal costs) and e±ciency in the homogenous good case. In case of dif-
ferentiated goods consumer surplus not only depends on aggregated output
but also on its distribution. The goods are not perfectly substitutable and
marginal utility of each good diminishes. Therefore, consumers prefer the dif-
ferentiated goods in equal quantity. Hence, gross utility decreases with the
diversity of the goods if aggregated output is constant. Since the willingness
to pay for each good does not only depend on aggregated quantity but also
on its distribution, aggregated expenditures (equal to total revenue) varies in
case of a mean preserving cost variation. In contrast to the homogenous good
case total revenue (equal to total expenditures) is not constant in case of a
mean preserving cost variation. Gross utility, aggregated expenditures, total
revenue and total cost of production changes. Hence, the relationship between
market heterogeneity and consumer surplus as well as producer surplus and
therefore social surplus is ambiguous. Furthermore, there may be additional
ine±ciencies due to ¯rms exercising their market power since goods are no
longer perfect substitutes. One would expect that at least consumers should
be worse o® in more heterogeneous market structures.
2It can be shown, however, that the exact opposite is true. Diminishing
total expenditures outweigh declining gross utility. Consequently, consumer
surplus increases with the dispersion of marginal costs and vice versa. Declin-
ing total costs of production overcompensate sales collapse. Thus, producer
surplus increases with the dispersion of marginal costs, too. Since consumers
and producers are better o® in case of a mean preserving conjectural cost vari-
ation there remains a positive relationship between market heterogeneity and
e±ciency as in the homogenous good case.
In the context of homogenous goods there is a huge amount of literature
analyzing the relationship between market structure and producer surplus as
well as consumer surplus (thus welfare). Dixit and Stern (1982) analyze a ho-
mogenous good oligopoly with iso-elastic demand. They show that equilibrium
prices depend on average marginal costs and decrease with the number of ¯rms
and elasticity of demand. Industry pro¯ts are increasing with the Her¯ndahl-
Hirschman Index. Market concentration (hence industry pro¯ts) increases in
case of a cost reduction of a single ¯rm if the respective ¯rm is more e±cient
than the average ¯rm. Consumers bene¯t from this cost reduction. Dixit and
Stern allow for di®erent reaction functions including the Cournot case. Far-
rell and Shapiro (1990) consider a homogenous Cournot oligopoly and analyze
the relationship between market concentration and welfare. They show that
even a (conjectural) reduction of the output of a single ¯rm increases wel-
fare if the market concentration measured by the Her¯ndahl-Hirschman Index
increases su±ciently. This is due to a shift in production from less e±cient
to more e±cient ¯rms. Kimmel (1992) analyzes the impact of an increase of
all marginal costs on equilibrium pro¯ts and the market price in context of
homogenous goods. While consumers are always worse o®, the equilibrium
pro¯t of a ¯rm increases if inverse demand is su±ciently concave (convex) and
respective market share is su±ciently small (big). Salant and Sha®er (1999)
use the results from Bergstrom and Varian (1985) and show that aggregate
cost of production strictly decreases with the variance of marginal costs. Since
gross revenue is invariant, industry pro¯ts increase while consumer surplus
remains unchanged. Van Long and Soubeyran (2001) show that aggregated
pro¯ts are an increasing function of the dispersion of marginal costs if average
marginal costs are constant. Since aggregate output and consumer surplus re-
mains unchanged, social welfare increases with the dispersion of marginal costs
too. Furthermore there is a stringent (inverse) relationship between the market
concentration measured by the Her¯ndahl-Hirschman index and the distribu-
tion of marginal costs. F¶ evrier and Linnemer (2004) analyze the impact of an
3arbitrary marginal cost variation on consumer surplus, producer surplus and
welfare as well as on market concentration in a homogenous Cournot oligopoly
in an extensive manner. They replicate the results of the aforementioned pa-
pers and allow for a simultaneous change of all marginal costs. The e®ect of
an arbitrary cost variation on the variables of interest is decomposed into an
average impact and a heterogeneity impact.
Lahiri and Ono (1988) show that a reduction of the marginal costs of a
single ¯rm may reduce welfare if respective ¯rm is relatively ine±cient. They
also show that closing down a su±ciently ine±cient ¯rm increases social sur-
plus. Zhao (2001) continues the analysis of Lahiri and Ono (1988) and derives
threshold values for marginal cost and respective market shares such that a
cost reduction reduces welfare. Smythe and Zhao (2006) re¯ne the analysis
of Zhao (2001) and allow for nonlinear demand and nonlinear costs as well as
technological spill-over. Wang and Zhao (2007) extend the analysis of Lahiri
and Ono (1988) and Zhao (2001) in a di®erentiated good context. Assum-
ing a utility originated by Shubik (1980) they derive conditions under which
marginal cost reductions reduce welfare in Cournot and Bertrand competition.
Even though most of the goods are not perfectly substitutable, there are
only a few studies analyzing the relationship between e±ciency and market het-
erogeneity in a di®erentiated good context. Assuming Dixit-utility, Singh and
Vives (1984) compare equilibrium prices under Bertrand and Cournot compe-
tition in a di®erentiated good duopoly. They show that consumer surplus and
social surplus are higher under Bertrand competition whereas producer surplus
is higher under Cournot (Bertrand) competition if the goods are substitutes
(complements). HÄ ackner (2000) continues the analysis of Singh and Vives
(1984) and shows that duopoly results do not hold generally in the oligopoly
case. Koh (2008) assumes a Dixit-utility and analyzes a symmetric oligopoly
with ¯xed cost under Bertrand and Cournot competition. He shows that pro¯ts
are always lower under Bertrand competition and derives conditions depend-
ing on the ¯xed cost under which there is excessive entry. Zanchettin (2006)
investigates an asymmetric di®erentiated good duopoly allowing for quality
and cost asymmetries. Depending on the degree of substitutability he derives
conditions under which (industry) pro¯ts are higher under Cournot compared
to Bertrand competition. Symeonidis (2003) analyzes the impact of quality
heterogeneity on consumer surplus and producer surplus thus on social welfare
in a vertically di®erentiated good context. Assuming a Dixit-utility he ¯nds
that consumer surplus as well as producer surplus and therefore social welfare
increase with the quality heterogeneity if the average quality is unvaried. The
4market heterogeneity is caused only by quality di®erences since ¯rms are as-
sumed to have identical cost functions.
The aim of the paper is to analyze the relationship between e±ciency and
market structure in a di®erentiated good oligopoly in an extensive manner.
Firms are assumed to compete in quantities and have constant return to scale
without ¯xed cost. The impact of an arbitrary marginal cost variation is
decomposed into an average and a heterogeneity impact. While the former
in°uences all ¯rms in equal manner, the latter is a mean preserving cost varia-
tion. Furthermore the e®ect of a cost variation on social surplus is decomposed
into its components consumer surplus and producer surplus. The results are
contrasted to the homogeneous good case.
This paper is organized as follows: the following section describes the
framework of the model. Section 3 presents the central results. Section 4 ¯-
nally concludes.
2 The model
Consider an oligopoly consisting of n ¸ 2 ¯rms competing in quantities. Each
¯rm produces one di®erentiated good Qi with i = 1;:::;n. Abstracting from
¯xed cost, each ¯rm incurs constant marginal cost ci. Let qi denote the quantity
produced by ¯rm i = 1;:::;n. The quasi-linear preferences of the representa-
tive household are described by a quadratic utility according to Dixit (1979).
Firm i = 1;:::;n faces the following inverse demand:
pi = 1 ¡ qi ¡ ºQ¡i (2.1)
Q¡i :=
P
j6=i qj denotes aggregated output of the competitors of ¯rm i =
1;:::;n and º denotes the parameter of substitution. In case of º > 0 goods
are substitutes and in case of º < 0 goods are complements. For º = 0 the
goods are independent. To secure that utility is concave the parameter of





. For further insight see appendix
A. Each ¯rm maximizes its pro¯t choosing an optimal quantity. Let Q¤ denote
aggregated output in equilibrium. Summing up all ¯rst order conditions given
by 1 ¡ 2q¤
i ¡ ºQ¤




2 + º(n ¡ 1)
(2.2)
Let c := 1
n
Pn
i=1 ci denote average e±ciency which is assumed not to exceed
1. Comparable to the homogenous good case, aggregated output depends just
on the average of marginal costs and not on its distribution. Industry output
Q¤ is unchanged in case of a mean preserving cost variation. Since goods are
di®erentiated, however, the (heterogeneity) impact of a mean preserving cost
variation on consumer surplus is di®erent to the homogenous good case. I will
come back to this point later. In contrast to aggregated output the derivation
of equilibrium output q¤
i is little more tricky. The derivation is delegated to
the appendix.
Lemma 2.1 (Equilibrium output) Equilibrium output of ¯rm i = 1;:::;n




(2 ¡ º) ¡ [2 + º(n ¡ 2)]ci + º
P
j6=i cj
(2 ¡ º)[2 + º(n ¡ 1)]
Intuitively equilibrium output is in reverse proportion to its marginal costs
and increases with the sum of competitors marginal costs irrespective its dis-















Since entry or exit is not subject of investigation I assume p¤
i ¡ci = q¤
i > 0
for i = 1;:::;n. Solving q¤
i > 0 for ci yields the expression is the following
assumption:
Assumption 2.1 (Oligopoly of n ¯rms) To ensure an oligopoly consisting
of n ¯rms, I assume q¤




2 + º(n ¡ 2)
+
º




Note that in case of substitutes assumption 2.1 requires marginal costs not
to exceed 1 (equal to the maximum willingness to pay). In case of comple-
ments, however, marginal cost may exceed 1 if rivals are su±ciently e±cient.
6In case of complements the willingness to pay for a good increases with the
consumption of rivals' output which in turn is in reverse proportion to respec-
tive marginal costs.
3 Results
In the following, the central results concerning producer surplus, consumer
surplus and social surplus are presented. In the terminology of F¶ evrier and
Linnemer (2004) the impact of an arbitrary conjectural marginal cost variation
on the aforementioned variables is decomposed into an average and a hetero-
geneity impact. In contrast to F¶ evrier and Linnemer these impacts are not
analyzed simultaneously and I analyze no subgroup shocks. Analytically, the
average impact and the heterogeneity impact are given by directional deriva-
tives. The average e®ect reduces (increases) marginal cost of all ¯rms to the
same degree while the variance is constant. The heterogeneity e®ect, however,
comprises the reduction of the marginal cost of a single ¯rm. In return the
marginal cost of another ¯rm increases to the same degree. The heterogeneity
component increases or decreases the variance of marginal costs while average
e±ciency is unchanged.
De¯nition 3.1 (Average and heterogeneity impact) Let AIF denote the
average impact and HIF the heterogeneity impact on F. In this study F is
given by producer surplus PS, consumer surplus CS and social surplus W. The




@ckdck. The average impact is
characterized by dc1 = ::: = dcn = dc. Without loss of generality the hetero-
geneity impact is given by a conjectural variation of ck and cl with k < l and












Note that the 'directions' dc1 = ::: = dcn and dck = ¡dcl just equal
the Eigenvectors of the matrix of coe±cients characterizing the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium given by (B.2).
73.1 Producer surplus
In the following, the relationship between producer surplus and market struc-






¡i) is just the sum of
all equilibrium pro¯ts.
Proposition 3.1 (Average Impact) The average impact on equilibrium pro¯t
of ¯rm i = 1;:::;n and producer surplus is positive (negative) if all ¯rms are
positively (negatively) a®ected by the cost variation.
Proof: Due to linearity, the average impact on producer surplus is just the sum









































¡[2 + º(n ¡ 2)] + º(n ¡ 1)






2 + º(n ¡ 1)
< 0 (3.2)









2 + º(n ¡ 1)
=
¡2Q¤
2 + º(n ¡ 1)
< 0 (3.3)
All ¯rms are worse o® in case of a cost variation making all ¯rms less e±cient
and vice versa. ¤
The average impact on equilibrium pro¯t has two opposite components.
On the one hand making all competitors more e±cient has a negative e®ect on
the equilibrium pro¯t, since all substitutes of the product are getting cheaper
and, therefore, more attractive. This e®ect is given by º(n ¡ 1) in (3.1). On
the other, hand each ¯rm bene¯ts by a reduction of its marginal cost. This
e®ect is given by ¡[2+º(n¡2)] in (3.1). The latter e®ect, however, outweighs
the former e®ect. The pro¯t of each ¯rm increases in case of a cost variation
decreasing all marginal costs and vice versa.
8This result coincides with the homogenous good case since producer surplus
decreases if all ¯rms are negatively a®ected unless market concentration is suf-
¯ciently high and inverse demand is su±ciently concave. Since inverse demand
is linear in this model, ¯rms are always worse o® increasing all marginal costs.
In the homogenous good case a ¯rm bene¯ts by an increase of all marginal
costs if its market share is su±ciently big and inverse demand su±ciently con-
cave. This is due to a shift in production from the ine±cient to the e±cient
¯rms. Compare Seade (1985), Kimmel (1992) or F¶ evrier and Linnemer (2004).
In the following, the dispersion of marginal costs is varied while keeping
average e±ciency constant. The results concerning the heterogeneity impact
on equilibrium pro¯t and producer surplus are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.2 (Heterogeneity Impact) Producer surplus increases with
the dispersion of marginal costs and vice versa.







i on equilibrium output q¤









2¡º; for i = k;
1
2¡º; for i = l;
0; else.
(3.4)
Intuitively equilibrium output of the ¯rm which is positively (negatively) af-
fected by the cost variation increases (decreases). The heterogeneity impact
on the equilibrium pro¯t of the una®ected ¯rms i 6= k;l is zero. Therefore,




















































¡[2 + º(n ¡ 2)](ck ¡ cl) + º(cl ¡ ck)




(ck ¡ cl) (3.7)




(2 ¡ º)2(ck ¡ cl) (3.8)
Producer surplus increases in case of a cost variation increasing the dispersion
of marginal costs and vice versa. ¤
Intuitively, the ¯rm which is advantaged by the cost variation pro¯ts and
the disadvantaged ¯rm looses. Reducing the marginal cost of a ¯rm increases
its equilibrium output as well as its price-cost margin since p¤
i ¡ ci = q¤
i.
The heterogeneity e®ect on the more e±cient ¯rm outweighs the e®ect on the
less e±cient one. Therefore, producer surplus increases with the dispersion of
marginal costs.
The heterogeneity impact on equilibrium pro¯t and producer surplus coin-
cides with the homogenous good case. Compare Bergstrom and Varian (1985)
or F¶ evrier and Linnemer (2004). This result, however, is not self-evident. In
contrast to the homogenous good case, the heterogeneity impact on total rev-
enue is not constant but falls with the diversity of marginal costs. It can be
shown, however, that the e®ect on total costs overcompensates the e®ect on
total revenue. I will get back to this later.
Furthermore, the results coincide with those of Symeonidis (2003). Assum-
ing Dixit-utility he analyzes a vertically di®erentiated good oligopoly. He ¯nds
that industry pro¯ts under Cournot competition increase with the dispersion
of quality levels if average quality is constant.
The heterogeneity impact on producer surplus can be explained by another
point of view: in the following, the heterogeneity e®ect on its components, total
revenue and total cost, is analyzed. In contrast to the homogenous good case,
gross revenue decreases with the dispersion of marginal costs.
Lemma 3.1 (Total revenue versus total cost) Both total revenue and to-
tal cost decreases with the disparity of marginal costs. The heterogeneity impact
10on total cost, however, outweighs the heterogeneity impact on total revenue.
Hence, producer surplus increases with the disparity of marginal costs.
In the homogenous good case producer surplus increases with the disper-
sion of marginal cost, since gross revenue (equal to total expenditure) is un-
changed and total cost decrease with the disparity of marginal cost. Compare
Salant and Sha®er (1999) for instance. Thus, in the homogeneous good case
as well as in the di®erentiated good context producer surplus increases with
market heterogeneity.
3.2 Consumer surplus
Are consumers better o® in a more heterogeneous market structure character-
ized by some big and several small ¯rms? Does a more homogeneous market
structure solely consisting of equipollent ¯rms involve more favorable condi-
tions? Consumer surplus caused by the consumption of the goods q¤
i with
i = 1;:::;n is de¯ned as follows: CS













i. Let m denote the income of the representative household which
is assumed to be exogenous. In the following the average e®ect on consumer
surplus is analyzed.
Proposition 3.3 (Average Impact) Consumer surplus decreases with av-
erage marginal costs and vice versa.
A reduction of all marginal costs increases all equilibrium quantities and,
therefore, consumers are unambiguously better o®. This result again coincides
with the homogenous good case. Compare F¶ evrier and Linnemer (2004) for
instance. In case of homogenous goods consumer surplus increases with indus-
try output which again is negatively correlated with average e±ciency.
In the following, the relationship between the dispersion of marginal costs
and consumer surplus is analyzed. Are there ine±ciencies due to ¯rms exercis-
ing their market power in highly concentrated markets? Since goods are not
perfectly substitutable, ¯rms have more market power to enforce higher price-
cost margins. As shown above, the price-cost margin increases with e±ciency.
Compare (3.4) and (2.3). Since marginal utility decreases, consumers prefer
the goods in equal quantity if aggregated output is constant. Indeed, gross
utility decreases with the dispersion of marginal costs. Therefore, the results
concerning the heterogeneity impact on consumer surplus are surprising.
11Proposition 3.4 (Heterogeneity Impact) Consumer surplus increases with
the dispersion of marginal costs.
In case of di®erentiated goods a more heterogeneous market structure is
favorable not only for producers but also for consumers. Although price-cost
margin increases with e±ciency and variance of equilibrium output increases,
consumers are better o® in case of heterogeneous market structures. In the
limit case of perfect substitutes (i.e. º ! 1) the result coincides with classical
homogenous good models. Consumer surplus solely depends on industry out-
put which again depends on average e±ciency. Compare F¶ evrier and Linnemer
(2004), for instance.
This result also corresponds with the insight of Symeonidis (2003). As-
suming a Dixit-utility he ¯nds that in a vertically di®erentiated good oligopoly
producer surplus as well as consumer surplus increase with the variance of the
quality levels if average quality is constant.
The heterogeneity impact on consumer surplus can be explained by de-
composing the e®ect on its components: gross utility and total expenditure.
Since households` expenditures just equal gross revenue, the results concerning
¯rms revenue given by (D.6) can be employed for this analysis. It remains to
analyze the heterogeneity impact on gross utility.
Lemma 3.2 (Total expenditure versus gross utility) Total expenditures
as well as gross utility decrease with the disparity of marginal costs. The hetero-
geneity impact on total expenditure, however, outweighs the e®ect on gross
utility. Therefore, consumer surplus increases with the dispersion of marginal
cost.
This result is essentially di®erent to the homogenous good case since gross
utility as well as total expenditures decrease with market heterogeneity. Ul-
timately, consumers are better o® in more heterogeneous market structures.
In the following the heterogeneity e®ect on consumer surplus is analyzed by
another point of view. Consumer surplus is just the sum of the net bene-
¯ts of each single commodity. Let CSi denote the net utility caused by the
consumption of good i = 1;:::;n:









The term qi ¡ 1
2q2
i re°ects the direct utility caused by the consumption of
commodity q¤
i. The term º
2qiQ¡i describes the additional utility (or disutility)
12caused by simultaneous consumption of the other commodities. Associated
expenditures are given by piqi. It is easy to prove that consumer surplus CS
is just aggregated net utility of all n goods.
Obviously, the net utility of the non-a®ected goods is unchanged in case
of mean preserving cost variation since aggregated concurrence output is un-
changed and according to (3.4) the heterogeneity impact on non-a®ected quan-
tities and equilibrium prices is zero. Due to linearity, the heterogeneity impact
on consumer surplus is the sum of heterogeneity impacts on the a®ected goods.
Lemma 3.3 (Net utility of a single commodity) The net utility of a sin-
gle commodity is in reverse proportion to its marginal costs. The absolute value
of the heterogeneity e®ect is proportional to e±ciency. The e®ect on the more
e±cient ¯rm outweighs the e®ect on the less e±cient one. Therefore, consumer
surplus increases with the dispersion of marginal costs.


































According to (3.4) the impact on equilibrium quantity and price of the un-
a®ected goods is zero. Since aggregated output solely depends on average
e±ciency (cf. (2.2)) the heterogeneity impact on aggregated concurrence out-
put is zero. Hence the e®ect on the net utility of the una®ected goods j 6= k;l
is zero. Therefore the heterogeneity impact on consumer surplus is just the





























































Note that the equilibrium price is just given by p¤
i = 1 ¡ q¤
i ¡ ºQ¤
¡i for i =
1;:::;n. Furthermore p¤
i = q¤








































The heterogeneity impact on equilibrium output q¤
i is denoted by HIQ
¤
i. Fur-
thermore the heterogeneity impact HIQ¡k := @kQ¤
¡k ¡ @lQ¤
¡k on aggregated





rium price is given by p¤
i = q¤





¤ +HICi. Let HICi denote the 'heterogeneity impact' on the
marginal cost of ¯rm i = 1;:::;n with HICk = 1, HICl = ¡1 and HICi = 0






































k < 0 the heterogeneity impact on CSk is negative irrespective of the
distribution of marginal costs or the degree of substitutability º. Similarly CSl









l > 0. Summing
up CSk and CSl yield the heterogeneity impact on consumer surplus given by
(F.1). ¤
Hence, consumers haven¶t worry about heterogeneous market structures.
Net utility of a commodity is in reverse proportion to its marginal costs. There-
fore, a mean preserving cost variation increasing the disparity of marginal costs
makes consumers better o®. In the homogeneous good case, however, con-
sumers have no preferences about the distribution of marginal cost as long as
average e±ciency is constant.
3.3 Social surplus
In the following the relationship between market structure and e±ciency is
analyzed. It can be shown that a heterogeneous market structure is not a
14hostile environment for society. It provides a more e±cient market outcome
compared to more homogenous market structures. Social surplus is an increas-
ing function of the dispersion of marginal costs, if average marginal costs are










The consumption of the numeraire-good q0 is given by q0 = m ¡
P
i ciqi.
Naturally, social surplus abstracts from the distribution of total surplus on
consumers and producers. Social surplus is just the sum of producer surplus
and consumer surplus. Therefore, the average impact on social surplus is the
sum of the average impacts on both components.
Corollary 3.1 (Average Impact) The average impact on social surplus is
positive (negative) if all ¯rms are positively (negatively) a®ected by the cost
variation.
Decreasing all marginal cost makes society unambiguously better o® and
vice versa. In the homogeneous good case social surplus increases due to a
cost variation making all ¯rms less e±cient if inverse demand is su±ciently
concave and market concentration is su±ciently high. In this case there is a
shift in production from ine±cient ¯rms to e±cient ¯rms. This phenomena
cannot occur since demand is linear in this model.
Since consumer surplus as well as producer surplus increases with the dis-
persion of marginal costs, the following result is no longer surprising.
Corollary 3.2 (Heterogeneity Impact) Social surplus increases with the
disparity of marginal costs if average marginal costs is constant.
Thus, society bene¯ts from a mean preserving cost variation increasing
the market heterogeneity irrespective the distribution of marginal costs or pa-
rameter of substitution. A more heterogeneous market structure is bene¯cial
for both consumers as well as producers and therefore society. This result is
well known in the homogeneous good case and can be brought forward into
the di®erentiated good context. In the homogeneous good case consumers are
indi®erent between market structures with same average e±ciency. In case
of di®erentiated goods, however, society is better o® since producer surplus
as well as consumer surplus increases with market heterogeneity. This result
15also coincides with related research in vertically di®erentiated good models (cf.
Symeonidis (2003)). Consumer surplus as well as producer surplus increases
with the dispersion of quality levels if average quality is constant. Therefore,
market heterogeneity either in terms of quality di®erences or in terms of di®er-
ently e±cient ¯rms provides favorable conditions for e±cient market outcomes.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of a marginal cost variation on consumer sur-
plus, producer surplus and social surplus in a di®erentiated good context. The
e®ect of an arbitrary cost variation is decomposed into an average and a het-
erogeneity component. It can be shown that there is a positive relationship
between the dispersion of marginal costs and e±ciency. In contrast to the
homogenous good case consumer surplus as well as producer surplus increases
with the dispersion of marginal costs. On the one hand these results coincide
with the homogenous good case. On the other hand the results are similar to
related research analyzing vertically di®erentiated good oligopolies. Consumer
surplus as well as producer surplus increases with the dispersion of quality lev-
els if average quality is constant. Therefore, heterogeneous market structures
provide favorable conditions for consumers as well as producers.
A Utility
The quadratic utility according to Dixit (1979) is given as follows:
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16The corresponding Hessian r2U = ¡H is real and symmetric and can be
decomposed by P ¡1DP = ¡H. Let D denote the matrix containing the
Eigenvalues and let P denote the matrix consisting of the Eigenvalues of the
Hessian H. The correctness can be proved by calculating ¡HP = PD. Com-
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Utility is concave if the corresponding Hessian is negative de¯nit. This requires
negative Eigenvalues. Compare KÄ onigsberger (1993), p.74. Hence: ¡1 + º <
0 , º < 1 and ¡1¡º(n¡1) < 0 , º > ¡ 1






















B Proof of lemma 2.1
Competing in quantities, ¯rm i = 1;:::;n maximizes its pro¯t ¦i = p(qi +
Q¡i)qi¡ciqi choosing an optimal qi. Inverse demand p(qi+Q¡i) = 1¡qi¡ºQ¡i
is given by (2.1). The ¯rst order condition of ¯rm i = 1;:::;n is given by







2 º ¢¢¢ º
º 2 ¢¢¢ º
. . .
. . . ... . . .


























Let A denote the matrix of coe±cients. cT = (1 ¡ c1;:::;1 ¡ cn) is the vector
of constants. A is real and symmetric and can be decomposed by A = PDP ¡1.
Hence Aq = c can be expressed by PDP ¡1q = c. Let P denote the matrix of
Eigenvectors. The diagonal matrix D contains the corresponding Eigenvalues.
It is easy to proof that ¸1 = 2 ¡ º is an n ¡ 1 fold Eigenvalue of A and










2 ¡ º 0 ¢¢¢ 0 0
0 2 ¡ º ¢¢¢ 0 0
. . . ... . . .
0 0 2 ¡ º 0









The matrix P containing the corresponding Eigenvectors vi with i = 1;:::;n











1 0 ¢¢¢ 0 0 1
¡1 1 ¢¢¢ 0 0 1
0 ¡1 ¢¢¢ 0 0 1
. . .
. . . ... . . .
. . .
. . .
0 0 ::: ¡1 1 1











Prove the accuracy of (B.1) and (B.2) by calculating AP = PD. The Cournot-
Nash equilibrium q¤
i for i = 1;:::;n is determined by solving PDP ¡1q¤ = c
in two steps. Firstly PDz¤ = c is solved for z¤ := P ¡1q. Then the solution
of q¤ can be derived by calculating q¤ = Pz¤. The optimal z¤ must solve the










2 ¡ º 0 ¢¢¢ 0 0 [2 + º(n ¡ 1)]
¡(2 ¡ º) 2 ¡ º ¢¢¢ 0 0 [2 + º(n ¡ 1)]
0 ¡(2 ¡ º) ¢¢¢ 0 0 [2 + º(n ¡ 1)]
. . .
. . . ... . . .
. . .
. . .
0 0 ¢¢¢ ¡(2 ¡ º) 2 ¡ º [2 + º(n ¡ 1)]


























Summing up the ¯rst and the second row yields the new second row. The new
second row is added to the third row which again yields the new third row and










2 ¡ º 0 ¢¢¢ 0 0 [2 + º(n ¡ 1)]
0 2 ¡ º ¢¢¢ 0 0 2[2 + º(n ¡ 1)]
0 0 ¢¢¢ 0 0 3[2 + º(n ¡ 1)]
. . .
. . . ... . . .
. . .
. . .
0 0 ¢¢¢ 0 2 ¡ º (n ¡ 1)[2 + º(n ¡ 1)]




















2 ¡ c1 ¡ c2
. . .





















n[2 + º(n ¡ 1)]
(B.3)
Inserting z¤
n given by (B.3) in the row before last which is given as follows
(2 ¡ º)z
¤
n¡1 + (n ¡ 1)[2 + º(n ¡ 1)]z
¤




yield the solution for z¤







(n ¡ 1) ¡
n¡1 X
i=1









(n ¡ 1) ¡
n¡1 X
i=1











(n ¡ 1) ¡
n¡1 X
i=1






















i are given by q¤ = Pz¤. Therefore, the solution for
q¤


























n[2 + (n ¡ 1)º]
=
(2 ¡ º) ¡ 2¡º
n
Pn
i=1 ci + [2 + (n ¡ 1)º]
¡Pn¡1





(2 ¡ º)[2 + (n ¡ 1)º]
=
(2 ¡ º) ¡ 2¡º
n
Pn
i=1 ci + 2
Pn¡1
i=1 ci + (n ¡ 1)º
Pn¡1
i=1 ci










(2 ¡ º)[2 + (n ¡ 1)º]










n (n ¡ 1)º
¤
cn










(2 ¡ º)[2 + (n ¡ 1)º]
=



















(2 ¡ º)[2 + (n ¡ 1)º]
=
(2 ¡ º) ¡ [2 + º(n ¡ 2)]cn + º
Pn¡1
i=1 ci
(2 ¡ º)[2 + (n ¡ 1)º]
Equilibrium output q¤
i for i = 1;:::;n ¡ 1 can be derived analogously. q¤
i for




(2 ¡ º) ¡ [2 + º(n ¡ 2)]ci + º
P
j6=i ci
(2 ¡ º)[2 + º(n ¡ 1)]
¤ (B.5)
C Proof of equation 2.3
In the following I show that equilibrium pro¯t ¦¤
i is just its squared quantity.
Equilibrium price can be obtained by inserting equilibrium quantities given by
(B.5) in the inverse demand. It holds p¤











(n ¡ 1)(2 ¡ º) ¡ [2 + º(n ¡ 2)]
P
j6=i cj + º(n ¡ 1)ci + º(n ¡ 2)
P
j6=i cj
(2 ¡ º)[2 + º(n ¡ 1)]
It remains to show that p¤




i ¡ ci = ¡ q
¤
i +
(2 ¡ º)[2 + º(n ¡ 1)] ¡ º(n ¡ 1)(2 ¡ º)
(2 ¡ º)[2 + º(n ¡ 1)]
+
¡º2(n ¡ 1) ¡ (2 ¡ º)[2 + º(n ¡ 1)]
(2 ¡ º)[2 + º(n ¡ 1)]
ci
+
º[2 + º(n ¡ 2)] ¡ º2(n ¡ 2)]







2(2 ¡ º) + [¡4 + (2 ¡ n)2º]ci + 2º
P
j6=i cj









D Proof of lemma 3.1
The heterogeneity impact HIR







































According to (3.4) the heterogeneity impact on the output of the una®ected
¯rms is zero. Since p¤
i = q¤
i + ci the heterogeneity impact on the equilibrium
price of the una®ected ¯rms is zero. Hence the heterogeneity impact on total







whereas the heterogeneity impact on revenue HIR
¤


























































i denotes the heterogeneity impact on the equilibrium price of




i + ci the heterogeneity impact on
market price p¤











Let HICi := @kci ¡@lci denote the 'heterogeneity impact' on the marginal cost





1; for i = k;
¡1; for i = l;
0; else.
(D.4)






































i + ci) + HICi q
¤
i
Since the heterogeneity impact on the quantity and the marginal cost of the
una®ected ¯rms j 6= k;l is zero and HIQk = ¡HIQl = ¡1
2¡º, the heterogeneity









k + ck) + q¤
k; for i = k;
1
2¡º(2q¤
l + cl) ¡ q¤
l ; for i = l;
0; else.
23Since 2HIQk +1 = ¡º





















2¡ºcl; for i = l;
= 0; else.
(D.5)
Hence in case of substitutes (i.e. º ¸ 0) the heterogeneity impact on revenue
k is negative and the heterogeneity impact on revenue l is positive. Note that
in case of complements this is not true in general. Hence the heterogeneity


































































< 0; for ck > cl;
= 0; for ck = cl;
> 0; for ck < cl:
(D.6)
Hence total revenue diminishes (increases) if the more (less) e±cient ¯rm is get-
ting more e±cient. This result is true in case of substitutes and complements
even though the heterogeneity impact on revenue Rk must not be negative in
case of complements (cf. (D.5)). In the following the heterogeneity impact on




































































> 0; for ck < cl;
= 0; for ck = cl;
< 0; for ck > cl:
(D.7)
Hence the heterogeneity impact on total costs is negative (positive) if the
more (less) e±cient ¯rm is getting more e±cient. Obviously the heterogeneity








(ck ¡ cl) <
¡2(1 ¡ º)








Hence for ck > cl the diminishing total costs outweigh the diminishing revenue
and vice versa. Thus the heterogeneity impact on producer surplus is positive
(negative) if the more (less) e±cient ¯rm is getting more e±cient. Note that
the heterogeneity impact on producer surplus is just the di®erence between
the heterogeneity impact on revenue and total costs. Hence subtracting (D.7)
from (D.6) yields (3.8). ¤
E Proof of proposition 3.3


































¤ on consumer surplus in equilibrium

















































































Since market price p¤
i is given by p¤
i = q¤





















































Rearranging the terms deftly allows to factor out p¤





















































i ¡ ci = q¤
























































i on the equilibrium output of


















1 + º(n ¡ 1)










and Q¤ > 0 the average impact on
consumer surplus is positive (negative) if all ¯rms are positively (negatively)
a®ected by the cost variation. ¤
F Proof of proposition 3.4




¤ is derived. The partial derivatives @k CS



























































27Hence the heterogeneity impact on consumer surplus HICS
¤ := @k CS¡@l CS
















































According to (3.4) the heterogeneity impact on the equilibrium output of the






































(2 ¡ º)2(ck ¡ cl) (F.1)
Thus the heterogeneity impact on consumer surplus is positive (negative) if
the more ine±cient (e±cient) ¯rm is getting more e±cient. ¤
G Proof of lemma 3.2
Note that households` expenditures just equal to ¯rms` total revenue which was
analyzed already in appendix D. Hence the heterogeneity impact on house-
holds expenditures is given by (D.6). Thus it remains analyzing the hetero-
geneity impact on consumers utility U(q¤
0;q¤
1;:::;q¤





































































































According to (3.4) the heterogeneity impact on the output of the una®ected
¯rms is zero. Since HIQk = ¡HIQl it holds:
@kU
¤ ¡ @lU
¤ = HIQk p
¤


































(2 ¡ º)2(ck ¡ cl) (G.1)
Hence the heterogeneity impact on consumer surplus is negative (positive)
if the more (less) e±cient ¯rm is positively a®ected by the cost variation.
It is easy to check that the heterogeneity impact on consumer expenditures















29Since the heterogeneity impact on consumers expenditures outweighs the het-
erogeneity impact on consumers utility the heterogeneity impact on consumer
surplus is positive (negative) if the more (less) e±cient ¯rm is getting more
e±cient. ¤
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